

A economia e o voto

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A resposta parece simples

“Good times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out.” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).

Mas se é simples, por que há “more than 500 titles” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013) sobre o assunto?

Na realidade, muitas dúvidas, contingências, variabilidade

1. O que significa “good times”?
2. Quem é afectado pelo quê?
3. Efeitos de moderação.
4. “Realidades” vs. “percepções”.

O que significa “good times”?

- Que indicadores, níveis, mudanças?
- *Benchmarking.*
- Simetria?

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Quem é afectado pelo quê?

- Reputação e responsabilização: *salient goal*.
- Reputação e representação: *clientele*.
- “Luxury voting”.

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Unemployment and the Democratic Electoral Advantage

JOHN R. WRIGHT *Ohio State University*

FIGURE 2. Average Unemployment during First, Second, Third, and Last Years of Presidential Administrations, 1948–2008




TABLE 7. Effects of Unemployment on Democratic Percentage of the Two-party Vote by Type of Election^a

Type of Election	Incumbent Presidential Party		
	Democrat	Republican	Pooled
Presidential election	.182*** (.042) N = 6,222	.273*** (.049) N = 6,222	.198*** (.058) N = 12,444
Gubernatorial election: Democrat incumbent party	.436*** (.112) N = 3,082	.659*** (.071) N = 1,350	.515*** (.185) N = 10,621
Gubernatorial election: Republican incumbent party	.161 (.109) N = 3,346	.884*** (.196) N = 2,843	

^a Cell entries are coefficients from fixed-effects panel regression using model IV (Table 4) and model I (Table 5) without incumbency. Pooled results are from model IV (Table 4) for presidential elections and model I (Table 5) for gubernatorial elections. Standard errors are bootstrapped from 250 replications. Significance levels are noted as in previous tables.

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


Figure 1. Marginal effects of government ideology (*Left*) conditioned by economic performance

Efeitos de moderação.

Efeitos de moderação.

- Concentração horizontal de poder.
- Concentração vertical de poder.
- Globalização.

Context and the Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis

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Table 1 Concentration of authority and economic voting for the PM (two-stage method)

	<i>All Cabinets</i>	<i>Coalition Cabinets</i>
<i>Concentration of authority</i>	-.081 (0.023)	-.075 (.033)
<i>Constant</i>	0.02 (0.020)	.007 (.02)
Number of observations	152	76
Adjusted R-squared	0.05	0.04

Note. Numbers in cells are coefficients from OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered on party. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The effects are statistically significant at $p < .01$. U.S. congressional election surveys are excluded. The dependent variable is economic vote for chief executive (the party of the prime minister in all cases except the United States, where it is vote for the president).

Efeitos de moderação.

- Concentração horizontal de poder.
- Concentração vertical de poder.
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Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis

Cameron D. Anderson Queen's University

TABLE 3 Linear Combinations of Horizontal and Vertical Clarity of Responsibility

	High Horizontal Clarity	Low Horizontal Clarity
High Vertical Clarity	Expected = High Economic Voting With Revenue = 2.06 (.27) ^{***} With Base and Rate Autonomy = 2.03 (.29) ^{***} With Borrowing Autonomy = 2.05 (.23) ^{***}	Expected = Moderate Economic Voting With Revenue = 1.44 (.14) ^{***} With Base and Rate Autonomy = 1.33 (.12) ^{***} With Borrowing Autonomy = 1.34 (.14) ^{***}
Low Vertical Clarity	Expected = Moderate Economic Voting With Revenue = 1.61 (.18) ^{***} With Base and Rate Autonomy = 1.46 (.13) ^{***} With Borrowing Autonomy = 1.52 (.14) ^{***}	Expected = Low Economic Voting With Revenue = 1.12 (.11) With Base and Rate Autonomy = 0.96 (.08) With Borrowing Autonomy = 0.99 (.07)

Note: Cells contain linear combinations from models 5 (Revenue), 7 (Base and Rate Autonomy), and 8 (Borrowing Autonomy). Values reported are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses.

^{***}p < .01, ^{**}p < .05, ^{*}p < .1.

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- Concentração vertical de poder.
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Globalization, Policy Constraints, and Vote Choice

Timothy Hellwig University of Houston

TABLE 2 Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Economic Evaluations and Party Issue Positions, 1997 French Legislative Election

	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)			
Prospective Economy	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.37 (.07)	.38 (.08)	-.01 (.11)	.58 (.08)	.50 (.08)	.09 (.10)	-.10 (.18)
Center-Right	.60 (.07)	.34 (.07)	.26** (.10)	.18 (.05)	.18 (.04)	.00 (.06)	.26* (.15)
Front National	.03 (.02)	.28 (.09)	-.25** (.09)	.24 (.08)	.33 (.08)	-.09 (.11)	-.16 (.17)
Economic Issues	Left	Right	First Diff.	Left	Right	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.91 (.04)	.05 (.02)	.86** (.05)	.97 (.02)	.06 (.03)	.90** (.04)	-.04 (.08)
Center-Right	.09 (.03)	.62 (.09)	-.53** (.07)	.03 (.01)	.20 (.05)	-.17** (.05)	-.36** (.08)
Front National	.00 (.00)	.34 (.06)	-.33* (.10)	.00 (.00)	.74 (.08)	-.74** (.08)	.40** (.14)
Social Issues	Libertarian	Authoritarian	First Diff.	Libertarian	Authoritarian	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.61 (.08)	.25 (.06)	.37** (.11)	.82 (.06)	.32 (.07)	.51** (.10)	-.14 (.18)
Center-Right	.35 (.07)	.59 (.06)	-.24** (.08)	.11 (.03)	.21 (.04)	-.10** (.04)	-.14 (.10)
Front National	.03 (.02)	.16 (.05)	-.13** (.05)	.07 (.04)	.47 (.09)	-.40** (.10)	.28** (.12)

Notes: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party coalition with standard errors in parentheses. Center-Left Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, PCF + PS + Greens. Center-Right Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, UDF + RPR. Values generated by using estimates from Table 1 and iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses mean values on age and education. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 1.


Voting in Open Economies

The Electoral Consequences of Globalization

Timothy Hellwig
University of Houston, Texas

David Samuels
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis


Figure 1
Effect of Economic Performance on Incumbent Vote Share
Under Varying Levels of Trade Openness




Note: Solid lines display the coefficients on the economy (conditional on trade) as a share of GDP and dashed lines display 95% confidence intervals calculated from Model 1.

Percepções vs. Realidade

Do you think the unemployment rate has increased or decreased over the past six months?




Do you think the unemployment rate has increased or decreased since Barack Obama became president?



Percepções vs. Realidade


PORTUGAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE



SOURCE: WWW.TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | STATISTICS PORTUGAL


Percepções vs. Realidade

PORTUGAL GDP GROWTH RATE



SOURCE: WWW.TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | STATISTICS PORTUGAL

Evaluation of the national economy last 12 months



Probit regression

Number of obs = 782


LR chi2(8) = 499.71

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -269.36399

Pseudo R2 = 0.4812

Incumbent	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ZLRSP	2.197106	.1480238	14.84	0.000	1.906985	2.487228
ZRetrecon	1.079266	.1483231	7.28	0.000	.7885585	1.369974
ZRetrepers	.0612063	.1480028	0.41	0.679	-.2288739	.3512865
cfemale	-.0301741	.1285292	-0.23	0.814	-.2820867	.2217385
zAge	.2244434	.1721818	1.30	0.192	-.1130268	.5619135
zEducate	.2177769	.1541538	1.41	0.158	-.084359	.5199129
cUnion	-.3428508	.276662	-1.24	0.215	-.8850984	.1993968
ZRelig	-.0194379	.146115	-0.13	0.894	-.305818	.2669422
_cons	-.5478607	.0664757	-8.24	0.000	-.6781506	-.4175708



Chi2(17, N=782)=826.7, $p < .000$, TLI=.930, CFI=.996


Total effects on vote:

Ideology: $.58^{***}$

Knowledge: $.03^{**}$

Retrospective sociotropic: $.24^{***}$

Retrospective egocentric: $.10^{***}$



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Total effects on vote:

Ideology: $.58^{***}$
 Knowledge: $.03^{**}$
 Retrospective sociotropic: $.24^{***}$
 Retrospective egocentric: $.10^{***}$

Indirect effects on the vote:

Ideology: $.05^{***}$
 Knowledge: $.03^{**}$
 Retrospective egocentric: $.09^{**}$