No dia 23 de novembro, Heinrich Nax da Universidade de Zurique apresenta no ISEG o estudo “Convergence in the Experimental Double Auction”.
Abstract:
Convergence to Walrasian competitive equilibrium in experimental continuous bid/ask double auctions is a finding of central importance in experimental economics and behavioral finance. First recorded by Smith (1962), and contrary to the common expectations in the field based on earlier results by Chamberlin (1948), DA markets do not fail to converge even under purely private information. This finding has been replicated and reproduced in numerous studies since, and convergence typically fails only when markets are strongly skewed towards one of the two market sides. The existing evidence has resulted in an informal folk result, whereby the DA is a robust market institution that tends to produce CE convergence reliably. In this talk, we present results from a large-scale online reproduction of the canonical experiments on the DA, and upgrade the folk result to a formal one, as we sample enough data at market level to conduct relevant hypothesis tests. The results shed light on the precise nature of the equilibration path, and implications for behavioral market design are discussed.
Os seminários de investigação decorrem de 21 de setembro a 14 de dezembro, às quartas-feiras, das 13h00 às 14h00, no Anfiteatro Novo Banco (Edifício Quelhas, 4º piso).
As sessões contam com a participação de docentes do ISEG e de outras escolas nacionais e internacionais, onde serão abordados tópicos relacionados com a Economia, Gestão, Finanças, Ciências Sociais e Matemática.
Entrada livre.
